OPSEC - Privacy Software

[ethical hacker]

NordVPN alternative >>> Mullvad VPN

ProtonMail alternative >>> TorMail, Courvix, Onionmail or Temporary Emails

Cloudflare DNS alternative >>> Quad9

Tails OS alternative >>> Qubes OS, Whonix or any BSD

Photoshop alternative >>> GIMP

Browser adblock alternative >>> UBlock Origin

GitHub alternative >>> CodeBerg and gogs.io

Telegram alternative >>> XMPP > Matrix > Session > Signal > Telegram > All Social Media

DuckDuckGo alternative >>> Searx.space, Araa and 4get

VirtualBox alternative >>> Virt-manger / QEMU

App Store / Playstore alternative >>> F-Droid and Aurora Store

Google Maps alternative >>> Organic Maps

YouTube alternative >>> New Pipe and Libretube

Microsoft alternative >>> Libre Office

Android OS alternative >>> GrapheneOS

Anonfiles alternative >>> Torrenting and Gofile

Your Home WiFi Network The best alternative >>> Free/Hacked WiFi Networks

[TheVikingsofDW]

Good thread!

Others:

Mail: TutaMail - tuta.com
Crypto: plisio.net
Monero: Setting up your own node.
VPN: Setting up your own VPN.

[anburaj]

why you put an alternative to Tails OS?

[ethical hacker]

why you put an alternative to Tails OS?

Tails, or "The Amnesic Incognito Live System", is a security-focused Debian-based Linux distribution designed to preserve "Internet privacy and anonymity".

While this may appear advantageous on paper, Tails, in practice, is less than satisfactory for several reasons:

1.- Firstly, it is essential to note that privacy is merely one layer of security. Tails does provide some level of anonymity to its users, but it does not offer more or less security than any other off-the-shelf Linux distribution. Therefore, the claim of being "security-focused" is entirely invalid.

2.- Furthermore, Tails asserts that it will still route the user's traffic through the Tor network even if the operating system has been infected with malware. This assertion is easily debunked, as malware running on Tails can obtain the user's IP address, discover nearby Wi-Fi access points, triangulate the user's location, infect the UEFI firmware, and perpetrate more attacks that do not require significant sophistication.

3.- While this issue is not entirely Tails's fault, they fail to document it, thereby giving users an illusory sense of security.

4.- Moreover, Tails comes with a sizable desktop environment, specifically GNOME 3, and numerous pre-installed applications across various domains.

Looking at the list of pre-installed applications, Tails developers appear to be aware of the malware deanonymization possibility via a side-channel, as they pre-install "aircrack-ng" for wireless network auditing. Nonetheless, they intentionally choose not to document this fact.
Points must be deducted for the bloat of pre-installed applications and the full-blown desktop environment, as well as the use of NetworkManager instead of systemd-networkd and systemd-resolved (Tails is based on Debian, which employs systemd). These factors significantly increase the attack surface.

5.- Tails's TorBrowser Bundle is not the original, unmodified TorBrowser Bundle. Instead, Tails developers have added their own touch by pre-installing the browser extension uBlock Origin. While this extension is beneficial, modifying the TorBrowser Bundle in this manner allows for fingerprinting and the discovery of Tails usage. This is problematic, as websites can easily identify Tails users and potentially exploit vulnerabilities 0days to gain remote code execution on the user's device.

6.- Moreover, uBlock Origin telemetry could compromise sensitive activities, and having more extensions increases the attack surface from supply-chain attacks, security bugs, slows down browsing sessions, and is generally a poor idea for modifying the TorBrowser Bundle.

7.- Lastly, since no one discusses these issues and Tails developers appear to be aware of some attacks yet choose not to document or warn users, we will deduct the remaining points.

For these reasons, Tails is, in my opinion, useless, as it offers an illusory sense of security that lures users into a false sense of safety when, in reality, they are at risk.

If you MUST use Tails, it is best to use it on a USB Live, refrain from connecting to your personal Wi-Fi, and exercise caution when downloading files, particularly when operating within the Dark Web.
However, I prefer Whonix, it is not perfect, no system is, but at least it has better privacy and anonymity than Tails.

[anburaj]

why you put an alternative to Tails OS?

Tails, or "The Amnesic Incognito Live System", is a security-focused Debian-based Linux distribution designed to preserve "Internet privacy and anonymity".

While this may appear advantageous on paper, Tails, in practice, is less than satisfactory for several reasons:

1.- Firstly, it is essential to note that privacy is merely one layer of security. Tails does provide some level of anonymity to its users, but it does not offer more or less security than any other off-the-shelf Linux distribution. Therefore, the claim of being "security-focused" is entirely invalid.

2.- Furthermore, Tails asserts that it will still route the user's traffic through the Tor network even if the operating system has been infected with malware. This assertion is easily debunked, as malware running on Tails can obtain the user's IP address, discover nearby Wi-Fi access points, triangulate the user's location, infect the UEFI firmware, and perpetrate more attacks that do not require significant sophistication.

3.- While this issue is not entirely Tails's fault, they fail to document it, thereby giving users an illusory sense of security.

4.- Moreover, Tails comes with a sizable desktop environment, specifically GNOME 3, and numerous pre-installed applications across various domains.

Looking at the list of pre-installed applications, Tails developers appear to be aware of the malware deanonymization possibility via a side-channel, as they pre-install "aircrack-ng" for wireless network auditing. Nonetheless, they intentionally choose not to document this fact.
Points must be deducted for the bloat of pre-installed applications and the full-blown desktop environment, as well as the use of NetworkManager instead of systemd-networkd and systemd-resolved (Tails is based on Debian, which employs systemd). These factors significantly increase the attack surface.

5.- Tails's TorBrowser Bundle is not the original, unmodified TorBrowser Bundle. Instead, Tails developers have added their own touch by pre-installing the browser extension uBlock Origin. While this extension is beneficial, modifying the TorBrowser Bundle in this manner allows for fingerprinting and the discovery of Tails usage. This is problematic, as websites can easily identify Tails users and potentially exploit vulnerabilities 0days to gain remote code execution on the user's device.

6.- Moreover, uBlock Origin telemetry could compromise sensitive activities, and having more extensions increases the attack surface from supply-chain attacks, security bugs, slows down browsing sessions, and is generally a poor idea for modifying the TorBrowser Bundle.

7.- Lastly, since no one discusses these issues and Tails developers appear to be aware of some attacks yet choose not to document or warn users, we will deduct the remaining points.

For these reasons, Tails is, in my opinion, useless, as it offers an illusory sense of security that lures users into a false sense of safety when, in reality, they are at risk.

If you MUST use Tails, it is best to use it on a USB Live, refrain from connecting to your personal Wi-Fi, and exercise caution when downloading files, particularly when operating within the Dark Web.
However, I prefer Whonix, it is not perfect, no system is, but at least it has better privacy and anonymity than Tails.

Thank you brother! I wasn't aware of all these and I've never tried Tails, some claim that it's very safe but not everything makes one fully anonymous.